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Words Beyond Meaning in Mapuche Language Ideology 
 
Magnus Course, University of Edinburgh   
This paper is about a fundamentally interesting question, and a question which I feel is pertinent to the 
scope of this special issue as a whole. Unfortunately, although the question is interesting, I don’t have a 
particularly concise or satisfying answer, in fact in many ways I don’t really have much of an answer at all. 
As I hope will become clear, this is partly down to problems with certain assumptions inherent in the 
question itself, but also because the object of the question itself hovers around an ambiguity, a 
misalignment, an equivocation (Viveiros de Castro, 2004b). This is very much a first step towards thinking 
about what an answer might look like, and why, despite everything, we need to ask the question in the first 
place. So what’s the question? Well, it’s a deceptively simple one: what is the difference between the 
Mapuche language, Mapudungun, and Spanish? Perhaps the term “difference” is a give-away to the 
approach that I’ll be taking and the theoretical perspective from which much of my thinking on this topic 
has emerged. For in using the term “difference” I’m following in the footsteps of a particular genealogy of 
anthropologists - the triumvirate of Wagner (1975), Strathern (1980), and Viveiros de Castro (2004a) - who, 
each in their own different ways, have persistently asked the question of whether our difference is the same 
kind of difference as theirs, with “ours” and “theirs” themselves being relative constructs.1 This kind of 
approach has congealed and spread and is sometimes located under the term “comparative relativism” 
(Jensen, 2011). As the editors of this issue note, it is perhaps surprising how relatively little engagement 
scholars working within this approach have given to questions of language. From the perspective of this 
approach, the question is really a question about a question: are we asking whether Mapudungun and 
Spanish are two different kinds of the same thing? Or are we asking if they are two different things? My 
rather unsatisfactory answer is that both questions are valid and pertinent to my Mapuche interlocutors’ 
thinking on this topic.  
At first glance, this kind of debate about linguistic difference might appear to come under the scope of 
language ideology (Kroskrity, 2000; Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994). But perhaps the question goes a little 
deeper than that, for we might ask whether language ideology actually skates around the question of what 
language actually is. One of the critiques of cultural relativism emerging from the kind of approach outlined 
above is that it leaves unchallenged the unitary identity of the “real” world; distinct cultures are simply 
different visions of a singular, shared reality, a reality or “world” that is assumed as a given (cf. Holbraad & 
Pedersen, 2017). We might want to transpose this argument to the realm of language and ask whether the 
questions we ask about language ideologies (or indeed the entire concept itself) are simply different takes 
on a singular, given, unitary phenomenon that is language? For if we follow through to their logical ends 
                                                 
1 I am a disciple, albeit an inconstant one (Course, 2010). 
some of the ideas people hold, we might be forced to at the very least re-consider the assumption that 
“language” is a self-evident, singular thing in the world. I return to this possibility in the conclusion, but 
for now let me start with some background information about the rural Mapuche people with whom I 
work and about the linguistic context. 
The Mapuche Nation and Mapudungun 
The Mapuche are an indigenous group of approximately one million people, most of whom live in Chile, 
but some of whom live across the cordillera in western Argentina. The Mapuche heartland is the Eighth, 
Ninth, and Tenth regions of southern Chile, although due to urban migration, over half of the Mapuche 
population is now resident in the Chilean capital, Santiago. My own research was in rural communities 
sandwiched between Lago Budi and the Pacific Ocean in southern Chile’s Ninth Region. People there 
survive through a mixture of government subsidy and subsistence agriculture, and don’t live in villages, but 
in scattered, often quite isolated homesteads (Course, 2011; Di Giminiani, 2012; González, 2016). 
Nearly all of the adults with whom I’ve worked are bilingual in both Spanish and Mapudungun.2 There are 
a few monolingual Mapudungun speakers, and significantly more monolingual Spanish speakers. This maps 
roughly onto axes of both gender and age, i.e. young people are more likely to speak just Spanish than older 
people, and women are more likely to speak just Mapudungun than men. These days, although one will 
hear conversations in Mapudungun on a daily basis, most day to day interaction is carried out in Spanish. 
Thus although Spanish is referred to in Mapudungun as winkadungun, “white people’s language,” it is deeply 
and firmly embedded in contemporary rural Mapuche life and has been fully embraced by Mapuche poets, 
musicians, activists, and politicians (Crow, 2013). 
Mapudungun and Ritual 
Despite, or perhaps because of, this positive and creative embracing of Spanish, I was frequently struck 
during my years in southern Chile by the absolute insistence of the people with whom I lived that certain 
practices must be carried out in Mapudungun, not Spanish. These practices include funeral orations 
(amulpüllün), meetings for organizing the ritual sport of palin (trawun), and meetings for organizing the great 
ngillatun fertility ritual, and the prayers in the ritual itself. All of these practices correspond roughly to what 
is referred to in some contexts as wimtun “Mapuche customs or traditions”, and in other contexts as ad 
mapu, “the way or aspect of the world”. Let me give three brief examples of the debates to which language 
choice in these contexts gives rise:  
                                                 
2 The genetic relationship of Mapudungun to other Amerindian languages is an issue of no little controversy 
and as such is probably best thought of as a linguistic isolate. Recent studies of Mapudungun include 
Golluscio (2006); Smeets (2008); and Zúñiga (2000). 
 
Alfredo was a young man who, like many young Mapuche people, had spent quite a few years in Santiago. 
He was the son of the local lonko, or headman, and was the child of the polygynous lonko’s lead wife or unan 
kure. This made Alfredo the most likely candidate to succeed his father, and Alfredo’s desire to organize a 
game of palin was understood by many as an opportunity for him to demonstrate his capacity to fulfil this 
role. Palin is a sport somewhat resembling field hockey, but played on a very long and narrow pitch. Its 
historical importance to Mapuche society, from at least the sixteenth century to the present, cannot be 
overestimated. I’ve argued elsewhere that part of its continuing importance and relevance relies upon a kind 
of fractally-recursive structure, in which the game and the exchanges surrounding it are understood as a 
nestled series of binary relationships (Course, 2011). And it is here, I believe, that the genius of palin lies: it 
simultaneously encompasses and constructs a series of relations of alterity that occur at a number of distinct 
levels. This capacity to create and open up these distinct kinds of relations to distinct kinds of potential 
affines that has assured its longevity and continuing relevance to Mapuche people. It is this importance that 
makes the act of organizing a match of palin such a delicate and fraught task, one which usually only the 
most verbally precocious will take on. However, in this case, there were several doubts raised about 
Alfredo’s capacity to take on the role of headman, the most frequently voiced of which was his perceived 
inability to speak Mapudungun fluently. “How can you be a lonko if you can’t speak?” said one woman. But 
when the day of the meeting to organize the game of palin arrived, Alfredo confidently conducted the 
entirety of proceedings in Mapudungun, with both fluency and eloquence. With the benefit of hindsight, 
none of us should have been surprised. He was, after all, the son of a monolingual Mapudungun-speaking 
mother. The point I want to draw from this is the twofold one that, firstly, lonko have to speak Mapudungun, 
and secondly, that meetings concerned with palin, have to be carried out in Mapudungun.  
 
A second example comes from the funeral of Maria Neculhual, the wife of one of my adoptive “uncles” or 
malle. The central component of traditional Mapuche funerals is the amulpüllün, literally, “the making go of 
the spirit” (Course, 2007). This is a series of discourses about the deceased, performed by two orators or 
wewpin. The discourses are basically composed of a series of mutual greetings, introductions, and then a 
lengthy biography of the deceased. This biographical component of the orations, the nutramtun, is said to 
“complete” the person, and allow their spirit to move on from the world of the living. Once the two 
principal orators have performed this biography of the deceased, other mourners are able to add their own 
recollections of the deceased, maybe pointing things out of which the two orators were unaware. Now in 
some cases, these mourners may not be fluent in Mapudungun, maybe they were raised in the city, or in 
some cases they may not even be Mapuche people at all and it is therefore considered acceptable for them 
to give their accounts of the deceased in Spanish. I had never, however, in the several funerals I’ve attended 
over the years, heard the principal orators speak in Spanish. But in the case of Maria, Juan, one of the two 
wewpife lead orators, chose to perform the nutramtun in Spanish. Now Juan is perfectly capable of performing 
such a discourse in Mapudungun – it is his first language and he has done so many times before. In this 
instance, as he explained to me afterwards, he chose to speak in Spanish as many of Maria’s grandchildren 
could not understand Mapudungun and he thought – to my mind quite reasonably - they had every right 
to understand what was being said of their grandmother. However, Juan’s decision caused upset and 
consternation among many. Even people who themselves couldn’t fully understand Mapudungun were 
mortified that the amulpüllün had been performed in Spanish.   
 
A third example can be drawn from protracted negotiations surrounding marriage transactions, mafun. My 
friend Claudio described to me the three kinds of mafun that were common during his childhood in the 
1960s: fücha mafun, “big payment,” pichi mafun, “little payment,” and ayuwunchi mafun, “compensation 
payment.” These different kinds of marriage payments and ceremonies corresponded to different social 
classes within Mapuche society. Here I describe the negotiations surrounding fücha mafun, the “big 
payment,” the basic template for all marriage transactions. On the assigned day the groom would leave his 
house early in the morning accompanied by his parents, siblings, paternal uncles, and close friends. The 
group would not go directly to the bride’s father’s house, as to do so would be considered “disrespectful” 
(yewelay). Instead they would go to the house of a close patrilineal relative of the bride’s father, referred to 
as the rangiñelwe, “the halfway person/place.” By not going straight to his counterpart’s house, the groom’s 
father was demonstrating yewenwen, a condition of heightened respect, that typifies relationships between 
bride’s and groom’s parents. Eventually the rangiñelwe would lead the groom’s party to the bride’s father’s 
house and the negotiations would begin in earnest. A man and woman from each side would act as 
ngillandungufe (translatable as “affinal speakers” or “purchasing speakers”), whose role was to negotiate and 
organize the payment of animals and other goods. Each negotiator was in turn backed up by an afkadi 
(literally “facing the back”), who stood behind them and was responsible for reminding them of the various 
requests and offers of each party. These negotiations could last for upwards of two hours. This elaborate 
form of brideprice transaction rarely occurs today. Local people explained to me that this was due to the 
fact that “We’re all too poor now.” There is no longer any elaborated distinction between “classes” of 
Mapuche people, and nobody is rich enough to engage in the type of transaction of multiple animals 
described above. Nevertheless, nearly every marriage is still accompanied by some kind of exchange 
payment, albeit in a much reduced form. My friend José, who married in the 1980s told me that two months 
after he had “taken” his wife, he was given some money by his patrilineal relatives in order to pay mafun. 
He bought a cow and, accompanied by his patrilineal relatives and friends, took it to his wife’s father’s 
house in Huapi. There they killed the animal and had a big party with lots of wine. José did this out of 
“respect” to his father-in-law. However, his primary concern at the time was neither getting married nor 
the possibility of his father-in-law’s disapproval, but rather, whether years living in Santiago would have 
eroded his Mapudungun beyond the requisite level to perform competently the mafun discourses. For as 
with funerals and games of palin, it was unthinkable to carry out any kind of marriage negotiation in anything 
but Mapudungun. 
 
Language, Hierarchy, and Force 
 These examples are but three of many that demonstrate the absolute insistence that certain practices be 
performed in Mapudungun, not Spanish. So the question is why? Given that the vast majority of people in 
these contexts also speak Spanish, and indeed as we saw from the second example, are more likely to not 
understand Mapudungun than they are to not understand Spanish, why the importance attached to 
Mapudungun here? The most immediate answer is that the different languages are associated with different 
values. This kind of answer is fairly obvious and one could fill a library with books by sociolinguists and 
linguistic anthropologists making this point for almost every multilingual context in the world. In the 
Mapuche context such an answer would take the following form: Spanish is the language of the Chilean 
state, of Mapuche people’s engagement with that state, and one could even go as far as to say that Spanish 
is, for Mapuche people, the language of “modernity” whatever that might be. Mapudungun, on the other 
hand, is the language of Mapuche people alone, of Mapuche solidarity, of “traditional” Mapuche practices, 
and the continuity of Mapuche existence. So put another way, we could say that Spanish and Mapudungun 
index different kinds of identities and thereby different aspects of the person. And these identities are 
hierarchically ranked, so in some contexts such as engagement with Chilean bureaucracy, formal education, 
and employment Spanish is understood as the more appropriate and superior language, as it is the aspect 
of the person as full Chilean citizen which comes to the fore. In other contexts, this hierarchy is reversed, 
thus in the practices described above, it is the “Mapuche” identity of the person which comes to the fore, 
thus Mapudungun is hierarchically valued over and above Spanish (cf. Bourdieu, 1982; Hill, 1986). I should 
stress that this hierarchy is context dependent (Woolard, 1985); I have seen some people ridiculed for their 
inability to speak Spanish, and others ridiculed for their inability to speak Mapudungun.  
Now as mentioned above, this kind of argument will be immediately familiar from any number of 
multilingual situations pretty much anywhere in the world. And I don’t think it is wrong. Indeed, I think it 
is adequate as a partial explanation of what is going on in the Mapuche context described above, but I stress, 
only a partial one. For this kind of sociolinguistic explanation only really addresses the question of the 
relationships between different languages and different identities; it leaves unanswered the fundamental 
question of what a language actually is according to local language ideology. Languages remain in a perfect 
state of ontological equivalence with people simply hanging values and identities on them, like coats on a 
peg. I think a step in the right direction can be found in the work of Webb Keane (2006). Keane’s concept 
of semiotic ideology opens up a series of questions about the nature of what language is. Thus the 
Protestants in Keane’s landmark study strive to reveal their inner “sincerity” through language as 
unmediated as possible. Yet Keane’s insights can be pushed further and recent engagement by Jon Bialecki 
reveals that such an emphasis on the revelation of a sincere inner voice is simply the figure to a ground 
constituted by an ideology of language emerging from external, frequently diabolical sources (Bialecki, 
2011). Thus Bialecki identifies both “centrifugal” and “centripetal” takes on the nature of language co-
existing within the language ideology of the North American Evangelical Christians with whom he worked. 
The key point is simply that any given instance of language ideology maybe heterogeneous, complex, and 
even contradictory. But rather than follow Bialecki’s investigation of heterogeneity and multiplicity in the 
context of a single language, what might such an approach reveal when applied to a multilingual situation? 
Could it be that different ideologies adhere to different languages? Or to put it another way, could it be that 
different languages are understood to be fundamentally different kinds of things? This is what I suspect to 
be at least partly the case in the Mapuche context, and my (admittedly highly speculative) suggestion is that 
Spanish and Mapudungun are not perceived simply as “equivalent” languages to which different identities 
and values are attached, but rather, are perceived as fundamentally different kinds of things.  
Put bluntly, Spanish, like other non-Mapuche languages, is understood as an arbitrary and fungible system 
of representation. Mapudungun, on the other hand, is understood as deeply and fundamentally attached to 
the very fabric of the world.3 Spanish is to Mapudungun as symbol is to index, to put it crudely. This is 
probably an overstatement, and there are many bits of counter-evidence which do indeed suggest a certain 
degree of ontological equivalence between the two. For example, they are both metalinguistically classified 
as “speech,” dungun, so Spanish is winkadungun, “white people’s speech” and Mapudungun is “the speech of 
the land.” So both are identified as speech. But there’s a clue here, even in what appears to be an 
equivalence, of a fundamental difference. Spanish, “white people’s speech” is associated with a particular 
kind of person; Mapudungun, “the speech of the land” is not, it is associated with the very land itself, a key 
clue to its ontological divergence from Spanish. I’ve written elsewhere in rather generic terms about 
Mapuche language ideology and its connection to ritual and it is worth reiterating some of that analysis here 
as it offers clues as to the source of this ontological divergence between languages (Course, 2012). 
According to Mapuche understanding, language bears a force in excess of and beyond that of a speaker’s 
intent. As my comadre María cautioned me frequently, “speech has force” (“dungu niey newen”), and this 
force is distinct from the speaker and frequently beyond her or his control. According to many Mapuche 
people, language has the capacity to effect results regardless of the speaker’s intent, thus simply to voice an 
undesirable outcome can bring it into being. The ill and the young are particularly vulnerable to this kind 
of careless speech, in which voiced concerns may very easily become realized through their very 
vocalization. Therefore one should never mention the possibility of death with regards to a seriously ill 
person, nor should one mention any possible defect or abnormality with regards to a newborn child. To 
do so would run the risk of effecting the unwanted result. This conceptualization of the “force” (newen in 
Mapudungun or fuerza in Spanish) of language is not restricted to accidental use, but forms an integral part 
of ideas about what could be called “magical” speech: curses, blessings, requests for permission to spirits, 
and so on (cf. Tambiah 1968). Language is neither personified, nor is its excess force understood to 
originate in some other agent; rather, it is itself understood as a process manifesting “nonconscious 
intentionality,” an idea which will become clearer as we further explore Mapuche notions of force. From a 
Mapuche perspective then, language is something upon which speakers have at best a tenuous grasp. Their 
                                                 
3 Such a view of language seems widespread throughout the Americas. See, for example, Basso,1985; Cesarino, 
2011; Déléage, 2009; Seeger, 1987; Smith, 1998; Townsley, 1993; and Witherspoon, 1977. 
intended meanings are frequently subject to the malicious misrepresentations of others, but more significant 
than this is the “force” perceived to be intrinsic to language itself. To speak (dungun) is to try and align this 
force to one’s communicative or pragmatic intentions, while bearing in mind that any alignment of what is 
intended with the ultimate consequences of each utterance is at best contingent and partial. Although the 
term newen or “force” is frequently used in everyday conversation to refer to the physical force of a person 
or animal, it also used extensively to refer to a volitional multiplicity of forces inherent within and 
constitutive of the world (mapu) itself. This force is a continuous, albeit fluctuating, presence of which 
places, spirits, animals, illnesses, harvests, deformities, triumphs, and defeats may all be exemplars. As my 
friend Ramón once told me, “everywhere is force” (kom püle newengey mew). Force is conceived as both 
singular and multiple; a particular place may be said to instantiate a particular newen, a force which may 
become further instantiated across a variety of forms: the productivity of the land, the spirit masters (ngen 
or püllü) resident in that place, any qualities good or bad inherent in the people born there, and so on. It is 
important to add here that there is no sense of a hierarchy of manifestations; a child’s deformity is not 
simply the result of a local spirit, nor is a spirit simply the result of the qualities of the people living in that 
place: all are equally manifestations of newen, a force which has no identity other than through its 
manifestations. To borrow a phrase from Nietzsche, “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; 
the ‘doer’ is merely a fiction added to the doing – the doing is everything” (2008 [1887]: XIII).  
That language is said to have its own “force” is neither to personify it, nor to deny that it can serve the 
intentions of a speaker. Rather, it is to suggest that the excess or potentiality of language is of a kind, or 
continuous with, the essential force of which all things are instances. Both the farmer sowing his crops and 
the speaker enunciating utterances seek to engage with, utilize, and channel the “force” of things, of the 
earth and of semiotic potential, while remaining aware that neither the fertility of the earth nor the meaning 
of speech is ever fully within their control. It could be said that this deep and intimate relationship of 
language with force, of dungu with newen, is theoretically applicable to both Spanish and Mapudungun. Yet 
my understanding is that Mapudungun is understood to be somehow more embedded in the flow of newen 
than is Spanish. When I think about the contexts and statements I drew upon in reaching the position I 
described above, they were mainly concerned with Mapudungun rather than Spanish. The insistence on the 
use of Mapudungun in certain contexts, is, I suggest, premised on its perceived continuity with the “world” 
(mapu), an indexical rather than wholly arbitrary relationship like that constituted through Spanish.  
And yet, to mobilize the distinction of symbol and index for an understanding of the distinction between 
Spanish and Mapudungun, while helpful in some regards, is probably not the best conceptualisation. This 
is because it is still grounded in an understanding of language as fundamentally about meaning. After all, 
a Peircean index still relies on a particular kind of relation to an interpretant and thus remains primarily 
concerned with meaning. For Mapuche people, Mapudungun bears meaning, for sure; but, as I hope to 
have illustrated, it also does much more than that. For no matter what analytical framework we utilise to 
address the issue, the key point is that Mapudungun always has an “excess,” a force irreducible to meaning. 
What I would emphasise here is that the semiotic and non-semiotic (extra-semiotic?) aspects of 
Mapudungun are not held to be in a fixed and static relationship with each other, but rather, are configured 
in significantly different ways to those of Spanish, the “excess” of Mapudungun being far the greater.   
Conclusion 
In this paper, I’ve argued that questions of linguistic difference need to be open to the possibility that the 
difference may not just be one of degree, but one of kind. In the context of language in the Amerindian 
imagination, the ontological possibilities for what language is take particular forms, structured as they are 
within particular cosmological understandings. But the broader point is not confined to South America 
alone. For as Bauman and Briggs’ (2003) recent engagement with the history of linguistics in the Western 
tradition has amply demonstrated, the hegemonic contemporary understanding of languages as all 
equivalent objects is the result of a distinctly modernist project, one perpetually threatening to come apart 
at the seams. As Kathryn Woolard’s work on multilingual ballots in San Francisco has revealed, even in 
such a modernist bastion as California, the idea that English is not entirely equivalent remains pervasive, if 
implicit (Woolard, 1989). As mentioned earlier, one possible conclusion for this kind of argument would 
be that “language” itself is a misleading category, that like Schneider’s (1968) assault on “kinship” or Lèvi-
Strauss’s (1963) on “totemism,” it obscures a fundamental diversity of ultimately irreconcilable practices, 
that Mapudungun and Spanish are understood to be fundamentally different kinds of things. I hope to have 
made clear that, as other papers in this volume also demonstrate, such an argument would be but a partial 
truth. As I stated at the start of this paper, when we explore the difference between Mapudungun and 
Spanish, we are asking both whether Mapudungun and Spanish are two different kinds of the same thing, 
and we are asking if they are two different things (cf. Viveiros de Castro, 2004b). With ever accelerating 
language shift and a highly complex politics of language, it becomes harder and harder, and perhaps less 
productive, to insist upon the fundamental difference between the two. Nevertheless, it is the very fact that 
Mapudungun is not easily and nor every way equivalent to Spanish that is precisely the source of its value 
and importance for many Mapuche people. For Mapudungun is not simply the index of a particular social 
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